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In the present study, we draw on previous system dynamics research on operational 
transition and change of vulnerability to investigate the role of incident response 
capability in controlling the severity of incidents during the adoption of new technology. 
Towards this end, we build a system dynamics model using the Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Industry as the context. The Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry has started to adopt new 
information communication technology to connect its offshore platforms, onshore control 
centers, and suppliers. In oil companies, the management is generally aware of the 
increasing risks associated with operational transition; however, to date, investment in 
incident response capability has not been highly prioritized because of the uncertainty 
related to risks and the present reactive mental model of security risk management. The 
model simulation shows that a reactive approach to security risk management might trap 
the organization into blindness to minor incidents and low incident response capability, 
which can lead to severe incidents. The system dynamics model can serve as a means to 
promote proactive investment in incident response capability.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For today’s organizations, connecting to a complex environment is not a choice, but a 
necessity in order to survive and thrive. Even businesses such as oil and gas production, 
where incidents could have major consequences, are moving towards this direction. 
Intense competition requires organizations to be more effective, often by adopting new or 
advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Baker and Wallace 2007). 
The cost to organizations is that more complex technology requires specialized support 
and resources, and creates a rich environment for breeding vulnerabilities and risks 
(Allen 2005). The contribution of advanced ICTs is often compromised, because of the 
unacceptably high levels of security breaches experienced (Dohertya, Anastasakisa, and 
Fulford 2011). 
According to the 2008 Computer Security Institute/Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(CSI/FBI) Computer Crime and Security Survey, 47% of the 522 respondent firms 
experienced computer security incidents, such as virus, insider attacks, laptop thefts, 
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denial of service attacks, unauthorized access of data or networks, and bots. The survey 
also showed that incidents have occurred frequently over the past 12 months, with 47% of 
the respondents experiencing 1–5 incidents, 14% experiencing 6–10 incidents, and 13% 
experiencing over 10 incidents. The average financial loss per respondent was USD 
288,618. Information security is a major concern of today’s firms (Richardson 2009). 
However, most organizations view information security control as an overhead and 
adopt a reactive management approach. Indeed, “actions taken to secure an organization’s 
assets and processes are typically viewed as disaster-preventing rather than 
payoff-producing” (Dhillon 1999). In simpler terms, the management addresses security 
concerns only when security incidents occur and are discovered. Note that not all incidents 
are discovered, some stay latent in the system and become threats to organizations. 
Several reasons account for the reactive management approach. One is the misperception 
of information security risks. In the early 1990s, when the use of the Internet began to 
spread in business organizations, Loch, Carr, and Warkentin (1992) conducted a survey of 
information systems managers and found that the respondents were aware of the threats, 
but naively viewed their risks to be low. Another reason is the lack of financial 
justification, given that investment in information security seeks to prevent an incident 
from occurring. What would happen and how much it would cost without the investment 
is hard to predict. Caralli and Wilson (2004) pointed out that “organizations do not 
routinely require return on investment calculations on information security investments, 
nor do they attempt to measure or gather metrics on the performance of such 
investments.”  
In this paper, we argue that the reactive approach to security risk management could 
trap enterprises into blindness to minor incidents and low incident response capability, 
which could finally result in severe incidents. We do so by building a system dynamics 
model that captures the dynamics of risk management. We investigate a specific case: an 
offshore oil platform that started transiting its traditional operation to Integrated 
Operations (IO), by adopting advanced ICT (information and communication technology) 
to connect to the onshore control centers and suppliers. The system dynamics model 
reported in this paper captures how investment in information security is made and 
subsequently takes its effect on incidents detection and security perception. It extends the 
existing literature on information security management by modeling the dynamics 
between incident detection and handling capability and security perceptions. This study 
also makes a practical contribution in that the simulation of the model provides a means 
for management to observe misperception and underinvestment, thus effectively 
illustrating the need for promoting proactive effort in building incident detection 
capability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the research context and research 
design are reported in Section 2; and the system dynamics (SD) model is presented in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we use the SD model to compare the proactive security risk 
management approach with the reactive approach; and we discuss our findings in Section 
5. 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
To build a system dynamics model, we chose the recent transition to Integrated Operations (IO) of 
the Norwegian Oil and Gas industry as the empirical context for model building. 
2.1 Research context—Transition to Integrated Operations 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry is transitioning into Integrated Operations (IO), 
by adopting advanced ICT (information and communication technology) to connect to the 
onshore control centers and suppliers. The operation transition will last several years 
with profound ICT-enabled changes to many work processes (Integrated Work Processes: 
Future work processes on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005). Such a transition 
requires operating companies to adopt new ICT solutions, including collaborative 
videoconferencing, remote control of hardware, and real-time decision support to link 
different actors (e.g., onshore operators, offshore operators, suppliers, external experts, 
among others) through high-capacity computer networks (On the petroleum activity (Om 
Petroleumsvirksomheten) 2004).  
Profound changes are expected to take place. In traditional operation, an offshore 
platform is essentially a closed system, such that all skilled resources need to be 
on-platform at significant cost and some risk to personal safety. In the IO paradigm, 
onshore centers normally closely collaborate with offshore personnel through ICT 
solutions that share real-time data and provide real-time collaboration facilities.  
Comparison of the characteristics of traditional operation and Integrated Operations are 
listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of traditional operation and Integrated Operations 
 Traditional Operations Integrated Operations 
Operation 
decision 
Daily operational decisions are 
made offshore with limited 
onshore support; 
Decisions are made together by operators 
on/offshore and consultants at vendors’ 
onshore expert centers; Several work 
processes and decisions are automated 
Operation 
plan 
Plans are made and changed 
fragmentally and at fixed times; 
Operation plan could be changed when 
necessary with support from onshore 
experts and vendors; 
IT 
solutions 
IT solutions are specialized and 
silo-focused; 
IT solutions are standardized and the 
vendors deliver their services digitally 
(i.e., over “the net”); 
 
During implementation of IO, there is a need to integrate ICTs and the supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems (Qian et al. 2009). SCADA systems are 
globally accepted as a means of real-time monitoring and control of electric power systems. 
Currently, operators onshore monitor the operation offshore remotely. In cases of 
emergence, operators onshore could activate ESD (Emergency Shut-Down) system or PSD 
(Process Shut-Down) system remotely. There has been a vision on changing from today’s 
manned platforms towards future’s unmanned platforms. The technology for remote 
control and remote operation is already present. But how to utilize the technology on 
platforms in a safe and secure way still needs further research.  
Operational transition is expected to increase production by 5%–10% and reduce 
operational cost by 20%–30%. Based on estimates, the net present value of IO on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is approximately NOK 300 billion (approx. USD 50 
billion) (Integrated Work Processes: Future work processes on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf 2005). However, despite the huge financial benefits of IO, operational transition is 
filled with challenges, including the major challenge of increased information security 
risks.   
From a technological aspect, the prevalence of standard PC hardware and commercial 
off-the-shelf software, in combination with the availability of remote control technology, 
has created a new opening through which malware can infect (and ultimately control) a 
system. The increased interconnections between SCADA and office networks create more 
points where the combined network may fail or be exploited by outsiders and other 
external attackers.  
From a human aspect, change is a difficult and painful process. When advanced 
technology is set in place and new work processes are implemented, people need time and 
effort to familiarize themselves with the new system. Unfamiliarity is one reason for 
human error (Straub, Goodman, and Baskerville 2008). The new operation is based on 
effective communication and collaboration via a virtual environment which is completely 
different from the traditional operation. Thus, learning to communicate effectively in a 
computer network is a challenge for most operators. In addition, those who are moved 
from offshore to onshore must learn new skills necessary to perform their new tasks. 
From an organizational aspect, new work assignments and new work locations can 
disrupt the social structures and their associated “know-who” networks in a company. 
Rebuilding such structures takes time. Above all, the company is moving into an 
uncharted territory where no prior experience and precedent exists. What to do, how to do 
it, and when to do it are the questions that must be carefully considered.  
Compared with the traditional operation, Integrated Operations generates much 
higher information security risks. For example, an unintended incident from an insider 
could occur if an onshore operator – believing that the system is in test mode – 
inadvertently closes valves, thus causing down-time. An unintended incident from an 
outsider could occur if a contractor – connecting to the intranet to do maintenance work 
–inadvertently introduces malware from his PC to the intranet. Such incidents could be 
also intended if the outsider agrees to act as “Trojan Horse” for malicious agents. An 
intended incident could be a planned cyber attack, exploiting offshore operation via 
internet connection (Sveen et al. 2006).  
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry is generally aware of the high information 
security risks underlying operational transition. To address these, they used several oil 
platforms as pilots for operational transition, one of which is the model building focus of 
the current study.  
2.2 Research design—Group model-building workshops 
Minimal data can be referred to for the current study because IO is a new operational 
method, and as such, no historical data is available for reference. We decided to use group 
model-building workshops to elicit data (both qualitative and quantitative) from the client 
(Andersen and Richardson 1997; Richardson, Andersen, and Luna-Reyes 2005; Vennix 
1999; Andersen et al. 2007). Two group model-building workshops were held. The purpose 
of the first workshop was to develop an in-depth understanding of the case and articulate 
the problem associated with incident response capability. The purpose of the second 
workshop was to collect specific data for model formulation. The details of the two group 
model-building workshop were reported in the papers (Qian, Gonzalez, and Sveen 2005; 
Qian and Gonzalez 2006). 
Seven people attended the first group model-building workshop, including the leader of 
the operational transition project, who is also a specialist in incident response 
management, information security experts and etc. Twelve people participated in the 
second group model-building workshop. Aside from those who attended the first workshop, 
the newcomers included the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), the platform chief, 
and managers from the ICT department. 
In the first group model-building workshop, the participants provided us with detailed 
information on operational transition regarding the transition plans, benefits, and 
concerns, among others. The participants identified more than 40 stakeholders, among 
whom the most interested and influential ones were the incident response team, the 
control room manager and the operator, the operator in the onshore support center, and 
the CISO. In another exercise, the participants listed nearly 40 variables and identified 
their behaviors over time, including new work processes, new knowledge, knowledge gaps, 
number of incidents, and average severity of incidents, among others. The key model 
variables were based on the information provided in this exercise, and the behavior 
patterns supplied by the participants served as the reference modes for model 
development. Some variables listed by participants were of little relevance to this project 
and were not used in our model.  
Furthermore, the participants suggested more than 30 policies, such as creating a 
formal incident response team, monitoring/measuring risk change, improving incident 
reporting, and observing annual awareness champion measures on security practices. 
These policies pointed out the possible policy scenarios for our model. We identified that 
some of the policies are related to a proactive investment in incident response capability, 
such as creating a formal incident response team, training for information security. In this 
paper, we explore how proactive and reactive investment in incident response capability 
could affect the severity of incident and incidents cost. Other policies will be discussed in 
forthcoming papers using different models. 
Eleven hypotheses about the operation transition and the risk change in operation 
transition were identified during the second group model building workshop with clients. 
These hypotheses form the basis for the SD model development. These eleven hypotheses 
were presented in (Rich and Gonzalez 2006) and illustrated with conceptual models and 
explanations. Here we summarize them in Table 1. 
 
Table 2 - The Eleven Dynamic Hypotheses  
H1 A knowledge gap drives risk 
H2 A work process and capacity gap drives risk 
H3 Collaborative workplaces close knowledge and work process gaps 
H4 Resistance to change traps collaborative workplaces 
H5 CSIRT capacity creates new and mature security procedures 
H6 Detection capacity reduces damage 
H7 Misperceptions of risk create detection traps 
H8 Mitigation capacity reduces damage and promotes learning 
H9 Evaluation capacity creates long term learning. 
H10 CSIRT operations may create a mitigation trap 
H11 Compliance dynamics further increase risk 
 
Our prior research has built a system dynamics model mostly based on hypotheses 1 
and 4. This modeling effort looked for ways to reduce the vulnerability of the system so 
that threats are less likely to penetrate the system and become incidents. The model and 
behavior analysis were reported in (Rich et al. 2009; Sveen et al. 2006). 
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Fig. 1 Model focus on vulnerability  
NB: Variables with boxes are stock variables which represent the level of the variable at each 
time step. Variables under the valve are flow variables which bring things into, or out of a stock. 
They are the changing speed of the stock variables. Variables with no boxes or valves are 
auxiliary variables. They are affected by the variables whose arrow head are pointing to them.  
 
Fig. 1 presents the simplified structure of the SD model. The operation transition is 
represented by the two chains of changing work processes and knowledge. Knowledge 
takes longer time to mature than work processes. Therefore, a knowledge gap will be 
generated and it drives vulnerability, thus frequency of incidents (H1). The practice of 
the new work processes in collaborative workplaces makes new work processes and 
knowledge mature and will close the gap between them. Change is difficult; new work 
processes and new knowledge are burden to people, which is represented by the 
variable new initiatives burden in the model. Meanwhile, the new initiatives burden 
traps the operation transition (H4), slowing down the maturation of new work processes 
and new knowledge. The main conclusions of the papers are 1) hurrying an 
implementation can result in significant risks; 2) special care should be given to 
knowledge development during the operation transition; and 3) knowledge maturation 
could help to reduce the vulnerability.  
Earlier research predominantly focused on addressing information security risk by 
examining the vulnerability of the firm. However, two approaches are generally used in 
managing information security risks (Ryan 2004). One is to reduce the likelihood of 
occurrence by reducing the vulnerability of the system. Faced with external threats, a 
system with low vulnerability can better prevent incidents from happening. The other 
approach is to reduce the potential impact of incident, i.e. to ensure that the organization 
can handle the consequence of a realized risk through investment in the incident response 
capability.  
During operational transition, policies related to the transition, such as adjusting the 
transition speed and enhancing knowledge maturation, can affect the vulnerability of the 
system and information security. However, the link establishing that incident response 
capability can reduce the severity of incidents has not been considered. Adding a feedback 
loop of incident response capability-building and understanding its influence on the 
severity of incidents can complete the information security risk management picture. 
3. MODEL OF INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITY 
3.1 Theory of incident response capability 
One of the main findings of the group model-building workshop is a theory about the 
incident response capability, mostly related the hypothesis 6 “detection capacity reduces 
damage” and hypothesis 7 “misperceptions of risk create detection traps”. This theory is 
conceptualized in Fig. 3. Investment in incident response capability leads to better 
detection of incidents. As more incidents are detected, perceived information security risk 
rises, resulting in more investment in incident response capability. Such reinforcing 
feedback loop can cause overinvestment in incident response capability. However, the 
more serious problem would be a situation where the reinforcing loop operates in the 
opposite direction—low investment in incident response capability leads to less detection 
of incidents. People may misperceive the system to be secure and safe, which, in turn, 
leads to less investment in incident response capability. The latent incidents in the system 
may actually lead to severe incidents with low incident response capability to control them. 
This whole dynamics of incident responses capability is the focus of our model-building 
effort.  
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Fig. 2 Reinforcing loop on investment in incident response capability 
3.2 Formal Modeling of Incident Response Capability 
Based on the dynamic hypothesis, a system dynamics model was developed to address 
incident response capability. The SD model is presented in Fig. 3.  
The lower part of Fig. 3 focuses on the change in incident response capability. The 
increase in incident response capability is mainly due to the investment of the 
management, which is based on the desired incident response capability. Management 
makes investments to adjust the incident response capability to the desired level. Building 
incident response capability takes time. If the investment is for adding more human 
resources to the incident response team to increase incident response capability, 
announcing openings for the roles, interviewing candidates, and signing contracts take 
time. If the investment is for improving the knowledge level of the current incident 
response team, identifying the proper training program, signing the contract for the 
program, and conducting the training session/s also take time. Normally, the delay in 
building incident response capability is approximately three months. If the desired 
incident response capability level is lower than the actual incident response capability, no 
adjustment is made. Incident response capability becomes obsolete over time. New threats, 
such as new attack tools, new vulnerabilities, and new viruses, emerge in the field of 
information security. We assume that the incident response capability obsoletes after two 
years. Learning from incidents can increase such capability. 
The desired incident response capability is based on the perception of the frequency of 
incidents. The upper part of Fig. 3 focuses on the perception of the frequency of incidents. 
Not every incident is detected; a fraction always goes unnoticed. How large this fraction is 
depends on the adequacy of the incident response capability. When the number of detected 
incidents increases, the management perceives that more incidents are occurring and that 
the information security risk is high. Therefore, a desire to have more incident response 
capability to handle all these incidents will arise. Change in the management’s risk 
perception occurs over time. Incidents occur because of various exogenous factors. When 
managers first encounter an increasing number of incidents, they perceive these as 
random occurrences. However, when they repeatedly encounter more incidents, they will 
perceive high information security risk.  
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Fig. 3 Model of incident response capability 
 
3.3 Key variables definition and parameter values 
Fig. 3 presents the system dynamics model on incident response capability. The 
definitions of the model variables, how they are measured, and how we set values to the 
model constants are discussed below.  
Incident response capability (1) is a capability set up for the purpose of providing 
assistance in responding to computer security-related incidents (NIST 2006). This 
variable measures how many incidents can be handled per month (unit: incident/month). 
This variable includes two aspects: one refers to how many resources (people × time) are 
devoted to the work, and the other refers to how productive these resources are 
(incident/people). A decision to increase incident response capability could be to add more 
resources to the work or to improve the productivity of existing resources (e.g., by 
implementing information security technology such as personal firewalls, host-based 
intrusion detection and prevention systems, workstation access control software, file 
integrity checkers, and patch management systems; or by training programs to raise the 
productivity of the incident response team). In the current version of the model, we do not 
disaggregate these two aspects. Incident response capability increases as investment in it 
is made and learning from incidents occurs, whereas it becomes obsolete over time.  
))capability responseIncident -(1*
effect Learning*incidents from learning  capability IR of obsolete
-capability IR of (increasecapability responseIncident 
+
= ∫
 
increase of IR capability = (Desired Incident Response Capability - Incident response capability) / 
Time to build up IR capability 
obsolete of IR capability = Incident response capability / Time to obsolete  
⑴ 
⑵ 
⑶ ⑷ 
⑸ 
⑹ ⑺ 
 
[1] 
 
[2] 
[3] 
 
The desired incident response capability (2) is the level of incident response 
capability that management deems necessary, i.e. able to handle all the incidents properly. 
Therefore, this variable measures how many incidents need to be handled per month (unit: 
incident/month), which equals to the perception of frequency of incident (3). If the 
incident response capability is lower than the desired level, an investment is made to 
increase incident response capability.  
The perception of frequency of incidents (3) means that in management’s view, the 
number of incidents that occur in a month (unit: incident/month) and it is based on the 
incident detected (4), which measures how many incidents are detected in a month (unit: 
incident/month). The Perception of frequency of incidents is normally smaller than the 
number of incidents that actually occur as, usually, not all incidents are detected. The 
incident detected (4) is affected by the actual number of incidents that occur i.e. the 
frequency of incidents (5) and the capability to detect them, the adequacy of incident 
response capability (7).  
The adequacy of incident response capability (7) is measured by comparing the 
incident response capability (the number of incidents that can be handled) to the 
actual frequency of incidents (the number of incidents that occur). This dimensionless 
variable ranges from 0 to 1.  
Desired Incident Response Capability = Perception of frequency of incidents [4] 
Incident detected = Frequency of incidents × f(Adequacy of IR capability)       [5] 
0.1<=f(Adequacy of IR capability)<=1, f’>=0, f’’=<0 [6] 
Adequacy of incident response capability = Incident response capability / Frequency of 
incidents     [7]                        
 
The severity of incidents (6) represents the average consequence of incidents, i.e., 
how much total financial loss is incurred per incident, which is measured in Norwegian 
Krone (unit: NOK/incident). This variable is mostly affected by the adequacy of incident 
response capability. 
Severity of incidents =Normal severity of incidents*f(adequacy IR capability on severity of 
incidents) [8] 
0.5< f(adequacy IR capability on severity of incidents)<5, f’>=0, f’’=<0 [9] 
 
The management goal is to prevent severe incidents from happening. Minor incidents 
are tolerable. According to the severity of incident, the management has divided incidents 
into 5 levels: level 1, minor incidents: less than 10K NOK/incident; level 2, serious 
incidents, between 10K NOK/incident and 100K NOK/incident; level 3: dangerous 
incidents, between 100K NOK/incident and 2M NOK/incident; level 4: Critical, between 2M 
NOK/incident and 20M NOK/incident; Level 5: disaster incidents, above 20M NOK/incident. 
According to the management of the platform, incidents in level 4 and 5 must be 
prevented. Actions will be taken to improve the system to reduce incidents above level 3. 
Incidents in level 1 and 2 will be fixed but not necessary in need of actions to improve the 
system.  
During further model development and formalization, we had several discussions with 
our client about the parameters and their values. In Table 3, we list the constants used in 
the model, together with their definition, value, unit, and validity (how they were 
obtained). 
Table 3 List of model constants 
Parameter Definition Value (unit) Validity 
Time to change 
perception 
Time required to change the perception of 
how frequent incidents happen 
3 month Suggested by 
client, experts 
Time to obsolete Time required for incident response 
capability to become obsolete 
12 month Suggested by 
client, experts 
Time to build up IR 
capability 
Time required for to build up incident 
response capability  
3 month Suggested by 
client, experts 
Initial incident 
response capability 
Incident response capability at the 
beginning of the operation transition 
0.1 
incident/month 
Suggested by 
client, experts 
Initial perception of 
frequency of incidents 
Management’s perception of how 
frequently incidents happen at the 
beginning of the operation transition 
0.125 
incident/month 
Suggested by 
client, experts 
4. MODEL SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
This model of incident response capability is linked to the model of operational 
transition (focusing on work processes, knowledge, and vulnerability), completing the 
model of information security issue during operational transition. The full model went 
through the standard model validation tests, including direct structure and 
structure-oriented behavior tests (Barlas 1996; Barlas and Kanar 2000). Due to lack of 
historical data, we were unable to conduct a behavior test, which requires comparison of 
the model-generated behavior with historical data using statistical tools to assess the 
point-by-point fit. Alternatively, we interviewed experts in information security 
management showing model behavior in different scenarios. Their recognition of the 
model behavior added confidence to our model.  
From the group model-building workshops, it is well acknowledged that changing the 
platform from a closed, self-sustain system into a connected system means more 
information security threats to the platform. However, little has been done to cope with 
such increasing threats. The investment in incident response capability will not be made 
until the management see an growing number of incidents really happen. Therefore, we 
use this model to investigate two different scenarios: (1) reactive information security 
management—invest in incident response capability when seeing more incidents occur, 
and (2) proactive information security management—invest in incident response 
capability before major changes, such as operational transition. Only one parameter is 
changed: the initial incident response capability. In traditional operation, the incident 
response capability is quite low because there are few information security incidents. The 
incident response capability prepares for approximately one incident per year, which is 
equal to approximately 0.1 incident/month. In the first scenario (the reactive approach), 
management keeps the incident response capability level despite its concern on increasing 
information security risks. In the second scenario (the proactive approach), management 
raises the incident response capability to 0.3 incident/month before operational transition 
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starts. In IO, the incident response capability prepares for at least three incidents a year. 
In this scenario, we first use 0.3/month, which is three times the original incident 
response capability. Different parameters can be tested using the system dynamics model. 
In reality, however, even when being proactive, management will not raise the incident 
response capability very high considering the limited resources available to the 
organization.  
Table 4 Parameter setting for scenarios 
Scenarios Initial IR capability Meaning 
Reactive 0.1 incident/month 0.1 incident could be handled in a month 
Proactive 0.3 incident/month 0.3 incident could be handled in a month 
 
The simulation behavior is presented in following figures. The blue line (1) represents 
the reactive scenario and the red line (2) represents the proactive scenario.  
The implementation of new work processes is scheduled as 5 new work processes the 
first year and 2 new work processes each year after. The maturation of new work 
processes takes around 4 months. The new knowledge is introduced together with the 
mature new work processes, while it takes even longer time (8 months) to mature. For 
detailed explanation of these figures, please refer to (Rich et al. 2009). The change of 
initial incident response capability does not influence operational transition. As a result, 
the behavior of mature new work processes and mature new knowledge (Fig. 4) is the 
same for the two scenarios.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Mature new work processes vs. mature new knowledge 
 
The vulnerability of the system, so-called vulnerability index in the model, is affected 
by new work processes, new knowledge, and knowledge gap. The vulnerability index 
peaks at the end of the first year when 5 new work processes are introduced. It slowly 
reduced as people learn to work with the new work processes. For detailed explanation of 
these figures, please refer to (Rich et al. 2009). Given that new work processes and new 
knowledge are the same for these two scenarios, this leads to identical model behavior of 
vulnerability index. In addition, given the same information on security threats, the 
vulnerability index is the only factor that influences the frequency of incidents. As a result, 
the frequency of incidents remains unchanged for the two scenarios (Fig. 5).  
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Fig. 5 Vulnerability index vs. Frequency of incidents 
 
The average severity of incidents at the start of the IO is around 0.6M NOK/incident, 
calculated by the data supplied by the platform. If more incidents happen, without more 
incident response capability, the severity of incidents will increase. Under the same 
amount of incidents, more incident response capability will lead to reduced severity of 
incidents, as incidents are handled more timely and in better ways. With the simulation, 
we can see that as the operation transition continues, in reactive scenario, the severity of 
incidents sharply increase to around 1.4M NOK/incident (more than doubled compare to 
the initial severity of incidents) and then gradually decreases to an equilibrium level at 
around month 60. In the proactive scenario, the severity of incidents peaks at about 0.9M 
NOK/incident, approximately 56% reduction from the reactive scenario (Fig. 6). In the 
reactive scenario, the incident severity approaches a critical level, which the management 
is keen to prevent incident over 2M NOK/incident. For the proactive scenario, the severity 
of incidents remains at moderately dangerous level (100K-2M NOK).    
Severity of incidents
2 M
1.5 M
1 M
500,000
0
2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
Time (Month)
N
O
K
/in
ci
de
nt
Severity of incidents : Reactive 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Severity of incidents : Proactive 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   
Fig. 6 Severity of incidents vs. Expected incident cost 
 
The expected incident cost refers to the product of frequency of incidents and severity 
of incidents. Frequency of incidents is the same for the two scenarios. The severity of 
incidents is lower in the proactive scenario. As a result, the expected incident cost peaks 
approximately 56% lower in the proactive scenario than in the reactive scenario. The great 
difference in severity of incident is caused by the incident response capability in Fig. 7. 
In the reactive scenario, the incident response capability starts from 0.1 
incident/month (Fig. 7). As operational transition starts, the frequency of incidents 
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increases sharply in the first year as new work processes and knowledge are implemented 
and a knowledge gap is generated. However, the incident response capability increases 
much more slowly than the increase of frequency of incidents (Fig. 5).  The incident 
response capability is quite inadequate to handle all the incidents happening. In the 
proactive scenario, the incident response capability starts from 0.3 incident/month. It 
decreased a little bit at the beginning when only small part of new technology is 
implemented and frequency of incidents has not increased to so high. When the frequency 
of incident quickly increases later on, the incident response capability also increases 
quickly.   
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Fig. 7 Incident response capability 
 
Why couldn’t incident response capability increase to the level of frequency of incidents 
immediately? First, it is due to the delays in the system. Time is needed for management 
to perceive the increase of incidents. In our model, there is a three-month delay before the 
perception of frequency of incidents changes because incident data are reported and 
reviewed quarterly. Time delay also exists in building incident response capability, as we 
explained earlier. 
Moreover, there exists another reason for the slow development of incident response 
capability in the reactive scenario, which can be explained by Fig. 8. With low incident 
response capability (grey line with +), a large fraction of incidents is not detected. Given 
that the detected incidents (red line with *) are the only ones that can be reported, 
management’s perception of frequency of incidents (green line with x) is much lower than 
the actual frequency of incidents (blue line with #); The low perception of frequency of 
incidents leads to low desired incident response capability and thus, underinvestment in 
incident response capability. After several years of slow development, the detected 
incidents gradually approach the frequency of incidents. The huge gap between incident 
response capability and frequency of incidents around month 12 results in high severity of 
incidents.  
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Severe incidents on an oil platform may have a huge impact, ultimately threatening 
human life and the environment. Management of companies in the oil and gas industry is 
keen to avoid severe incidents. The simulation result shows that reactive thinking can 
result in an incident response capability trap, which could then lead to critical incidents 
during operational transition. 
With proactive thinking, the incident response capability starts higher and a larger 
portion of the incidents can be detected. The desired incident response capability can also 
be higher, which leads to less underinvestment. Therefore, the severity of incidents is 
largely reduced in the proactive scenario (Fig. 6). 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This paper builds upon and adds to prior research by formulating/constructing a SD 
model of incident response capability during operational transition. The model simulation 
results demonstrate how proactive and reactive thinking in information security risk 
management can generate different risk scenarios over time. 
5.1 Implications to information security research 
The idea of information security surfaced with the development of early computers in 
the 1960s. Since computer was a product of advanced technology, computer security 
naturally came down to technology measures. With the fast growth of personal computer 
and the widespread of internet, human factors become an imminent issue in information 
security. A large portion of the computer and internet users have limited knowledge about 
computer and internet and even less knowledge about information security (Arce 2003; 
Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009; Yildirima et al. 2011; Dohertya, Anastasakisa, 
and Fulfordb 2009). Lately, researchers in information security started to look into the 
organizational factors too. For example, Werlinger et al. pointed out many organizational 
factors that weaken security. “Tight schedules may result in human errors that could 
make the organization more vulnerable” (Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009). There 
are emerging calls for an integrated view of information security, from the technological, 
human, and organizational aspects, sometimes referred as MTO (Man, Technology, and 
Organization). However, methods to tackle the MTO issues in information security are 
scarce. One of the research focuses is the development of information security checklist 
and standards aiming to capture the best practice. Another research focuses is risk 
assessment identifying the threats and vulnerabilities, and then determining the 
likelihood and impact for each risk. Risk assessment could either be qualitative, 
categorizing low, medium and high risks, or be quantitative, calculating the value of 
“Annualized Loss Expectancy”, which is similar to the “expected incident cost” in our model. 
However, static risk assessment method is less relevant for the case of this study, where the 
organization is going through operation transition, which is a complex, long-term, and dynamic 
process with feedback, delays, and trade-offs, among others. The risk picture will change along 
the way. It is necessary to consider how the transition affects the information security risks. Except 
the work from our research group, such as (Qian, Gonzalez, and Sveen 2005; Qian and 
Gonzalez 2006; Sveen et al. 2006; Rich and Gonzalez 2006; Rich et al. 2009), we found few 
previous research investigating information security risks during the operation transition. The 
previous research considered the technology aspect—more threats with integrated operation, and 
the human aspect—more human errors when operators do not have enough knowledge and are 
burdened by operation transition. This paper extends the previous research by adding the 
organization aspect—management’s mental model on investment in information security. The 
model simulation results show that management’s reactive mental model might lead to severe 
incidents while the proactive investment in information security helps reduce the severity of 
incidents. Analysis shows that not only delays in the system prevent incident response capability 
from catching up the desired level slowly, but more importantly, the reactive mental model could 
cause misperception of information security risks which leads to under-investment in incident 
response capability and the inadequate incident response capability could result in severe 
incidents.  
5.2 Contribution to information security practice 
Though information security has become one of the major concerns of today’s firms 
(Richardson 2009), proactive investment in information security is difficult to “sell.”. A 
paradox exists in information security management. If investment is made proactively, 
the frequency of incidents and severity of incidents will be reduced, leading low perception 
of risk and makes it difficult to justify the investment on information security 
management, just as the old saying goes: “Nobody Ever Gets Credit for Fixing Problems 
that Never Happened.”  
In this highly competitive world, companies try to cut any cost that might be 
unnecessary. Therefore, it is seldom that management are proactive in practice. The 
platform under study is one case of the many. A recent study of Stig shows that risk 
awareness of the offshore oil installation is poor (Johnsen 2009).  “Only 5 of the 46 
installations had performed a risk and vulnerability analysis, to identify the most 
dominating risks related to integration between SCADA and ICT systems.” This low 
awareness leads to poor incident reporting, misperception of risk and low incident 
response capability, which is a dangerous situation. 
System dynamics provides a foundation for developing theories and tools that help 
management understand, characterize, and communicate that investment in information 
security is essential.  Such a system dynamics model could be used as a learning 
environment for the management to raise their awareness of the potential information 
security risks that they are facing. Even when company data show a nice picture of few 
incidents and low risks, it is not necessary that information security risk has been very 
well managed and the company is resilient to threats. There is possibility that people are 
unaware of the incidents, or are not reporting these incidents.  
As a result, corporate should regularly check and analyze its information security risks. 
Internal audit or external audit program could be one way to evaluate information 
security risks. As suggested by Yildirim et al. (2011) “The only way of answering critical 
questions, for information security is to test the security of the information entities 
(human factor, software, hardware, media, etc.), through ‘penetration tests’.”  
5.3 Future Research Directions 
The current model is at a highly aggregated level; however, disaggregating it to include 
more details about work processes and knowledge would be possible. In addition, some 
work processes can have a large impact on information security, bringing higher 
vulnerability into the system. At the same time, the severity of incidents and frequency of 
incidents are both highly aggregated in that they are the average for all kinds of incidents. 
The platform has developed a risk matrix that presents the frequency and severity of 
various kinds of incidents. Incorporating the risk matrix into our model and 
disaggregating the average frequency and severity of incidents using the data in the risk 
matrix are possible. By doing so, we would be able to see the development trend of each 
type of incidents as operational transition affects various types of incidents differently. 
For example, the change of one work process can have a major impact on the frequency of 
human errors, but it may not have such an impact on the frequency of terrorist attacks. 
With sufficient data, the disaggregated model could be used to generate dynamic risk 
matrix, which is able to show how the risk matrix changes over time. 
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